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No Evidence That Shekau Received €5m Foreign Fund From An NGO

Boko Haram Terrorists

Fact-checkers at HumAngle online newspaper have described a news report published on Opera News that Abubakar Shekau’s faction of Boko Haram was in disarray after it received a donation of five mIllion euros from an “unidentified” international non-governmental organisation as false.

The publication claimed that senior members of the group have also turned against each other over how the fund should be shared within the group.

The story claimed that a military source said “Shekau is getting blind as such only the very close ones of his aides have access to him. The issue of €5m is causing serious disaffection in their camps.

“Shekau has been receiving such funding in the past and he was never able to build his terror infrastructure beyond what is currently being dismantled. Our commanders are not concerned that he is still defrauding those sponsoring him, if there is any concern it is that we should be able to capture him before his own fighters kill him,” the military source said as claimed by the news report.

Boko Haram Terrorists

But according to HumAngle newspaper, the Director of Nigerian Army Public Relations, Sagir Musa, when contacted to verify the claim said he was not aware of either the “verified intelligence reports” or the claim that Shekau received five million euros foreign fund through an NGO in the North-East.

The newspaper also said it searched autogist.com, the blog that the news was attributed to but could not find the story published on the blog.

“Fact-checkers at HumAngle contacted the Director of Nigerian Army Public Relations, Sagir Musa, to confirm the veracity of the claim and he said he was not aware of either the “verified intelligence reports” or the claim that Shekau received five million euros foreign fund through an NGO in the North-East.

“We searched autogist.com, the blog that the news was attributed to but could not find the story published on the blog. Also, no reliable medium reporting terrorism published the story. Other conflict and insurgency reporters were contacted by HumAngle but none was aware of the “verified intelligence report”.

“As the name of the NGO was not disclosed, it became difficult to trace its operation history.

“However, Nigeria’s military had suspended several NGOs from operating in the North-East following allegations of collaborating with the terrorist organisation. But no NGO has ever been charged to court by the authorities and the suspended NGOs were later allowed to resume operations in the region.

“Scholars and experts on Boko Haram have suggested different methods of terrorism financing, from state sponsorship to external support by other terror groups like ISIS and Alqa’eda. But Shekau’s faction of Boko Haram relies on self-funding streams through fishing, farming, crowdfunding, extortion, taxation, raids and ransom taking to finance its operations,” the newspaper published.

Quoting a report on Boko Haram sources of funding, it continued, “Much of Boko Haram’s funds are transported through human cash couriers, which are able to move rather easily between the porous borders of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad… very little evidence of either Gulf or other foreign funding exists,” a report on Boko Haram sources of funding concluded.

“Due to the strict surveillance of monetary operations to avoid terrorist financing in Nigeria, financial regulations have forced Boko Haram to avoid remittances of funds online. Such a huge amount is not possible to be transferred without its being intercepted by international and local intelligence platforms.”

The newspaper further said Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit follows any suspicious transaction with the aim of curbing terrorism financing.

“It collates information of all beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance to avert financing of terrorism through covert operations, thus making it impossible for any NGO to follow “previous channels and beneficiaries’ templates” of funding terrorism as claimed by the report.

“Humanitarian organisations work hand in hand with EFFC Department of Special Control against Money Laundering (SCUML) to checkmate their activities to curb terrorism financing, according to Abdurrashid Ibrahim a worker at the financial unit of an NGO in the North-East.

“Any transaction from five million naira must pass through a special control unit against money laundering (SCUML) clearance process be it for individual or corporate organisation,” he said.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that an NGO was allowed to operate after the military discovered that “Shekau has been receiving such funding in the past” as claimed by the news.

According to HumAngle findings, Abubakar Shekau does not operate or rely on an advisory council (Shura).

He is reported to be ruthless and brutal to any opposition within the group, making it unlikely for any Boko Haram commander to disagree with the leader.

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May 9, 2020
Medical Product Alert N°5/2020 – 7 May 2020
Falsified and contaminated Defibrotide identified in WHO regions of Western Pacific, Europe and Eastern Mediterranean

This alert relates to falsified DEFIBROTIDE 200MG VIALS OF 2.5ML (80MG/ML) CONCENTRATE FOR SOLUTION FOR INFUSION identified in Australia, Latvia and Saudi Arabia. This product is sold under the brand name Defitelio.

On 13 March 2020, the WHO Global Surveillance and Monitoring System on Substandard and Falsified (SF) Medical Products was informed that falsified DEFIBROTIDE 200MG vials were identified at patient level in Australia, displaying batch number 0286 (see Table 1 below for full details).

Following enquiries with stakeholders, on 8 April 2020, WHO was informed that falsified DEFIBROTIDE 200MG vials had also been supplied to Saudi Arabia, displaying batch number 0286 and 0126 (see Table 1 below for full details).

Following enquiries with stakeholders, on 9 April 2020, WHO was informed that falsified DEFIBROTIDE 200MG vials, displaying batch number 0126, had also been identified in Australia and Latvia.

DEFIBROTIDE is used to treat hepatic veno-occlusive disease, in which the blood vessels in the liver become damaged and obstructed by blood clots. This can be caused by treatments prior to a stem cell transplantation.

Laboratory analyses, conducted by national medicines regulatory authorities and the manufacturer of the genuine product, established that these falsified products do not contain any of the expected active ingredient. The solution in the vials is also contaminated with mould (Cladosporium sp. and Aspergillus niger).

Information available to WHO indicates that both batches of falsified DEFIBROTIDE 200MG vials were present within the regulated supply chain in Latvia as early as January 2020 and were also handled by medicine wholesalers in the United Kingdom in February 2020. It is important to note that widespread vigilance is required from all countries, regardless of where the product was originally identified.

Table 1: falsified defibrotide subject of WHO Alert n°5/2020, identified in Australia, Latvia and Saudi Arabia

The two products listed in Table 1 are confirmed falsified, on the basis that there is deliberate misrepresentation of their identity, composition and source.

The genuine manufacturer of Defibrotide, GENTIUM S.R.L has also confirmed to WHO that:
- They did not manufacture the above products.
- Authentic DEFIBROTIDE 200MG VIALS with batch number 0286 were supplied to Argentina, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Turkey.
- Authentic DEFIBROTIDE 200MG VIALS with batch number 0126 were supplied to Australia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, New Zealand, Qatar, Singapore, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
  For guidance and photographs, please refer to page 2 of this Alert n°5/2020.
Photos of Falsified DEFIBROTIDE Batch number: 0286, with expiry date: 09/2021

Sample from Latvia Sample from Latvia

Photos of Falsified DEFIBROTIDE Batch number: 0126, with expiry date: 08/2021

Sample from Australia Sample from Australia

WHO requests increased vigilance within the supply chains of countries likely to be affected by these falsified products. Increased vigilance should include hospitals, clinics, health centres, wholesalers, distributors, pharmacies and any other suppliers of medical products.

If you are in possession of the above products, please do not use them. If you have used these falsified products, or if you suffer an adverse reaction/event having used these products, you are advised to seek immediate medical advice from a qualified healthcare professional, and to report the incident to the National Regulatory Authorities/National Pharmacovigilance Centre.

All medical products must be obtained from licensed, authorized and reliable sources. Their authenticity and condition should be carefully checked. Seek advice from a healthcare professional in case of doubt.

National regulatory/health authorities are advised to immediately notify WHO if these falsified products are identified in their country(ies). If you have any information concerning the manufacture, distribution, or supply of these products, please contact rapidalert@who.int.

WHO Global Surveillance and Monitoring System for Substandard and Falsified Medical Products

For further information, please visit our website: https://www.who.int/medicines/regulation/ssffc/en/

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May 9, 2020
Statement on the third meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee regarding the outbreak of coronavirus disease (COVID-19)
The third meeting of the Emergency Committee convened by the WHO Director-General under the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) regarding the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), took place on Thursday, 30 April 2020, from 12:00 to 17:45 Geneva
time (CEST).

Proceedings of the meeting

Members and advisors of the Emergency Committee were convened by teleconference. Membership of the Emergency Committee was expanded
to reflect the nature of the pandemic and the need to include additional areas of expertise.

The Director-General welcomed the Committee, thanked them for their commitment to enhancing global public health, and provided an overview of the major achievements in the COVID-19 response since the last Emergency Committee meeting on 30 January 2020.
Representatives of the legal department and the Department of Compliance, Risk Management, and Ethics (CRE) briefed the members on their roles and responsibilities.

The Ethics Officer from CRE provided the members and advisers with an overview of the WHO Declaration of Interest process. The members and advisers were made aware of their individual responsibility to disclose to WHO, in a timely manner, any interests
of a personal, professional, financial, intellectual or commercial nature that may give rise to a perceived or direct conflict of interest. They were additionally reminded of their duty to maintain the confidentiality of the meeting discussions and
the work of the committee. Only those committee members and advisers who were not considered to have any perceived or direct conflict of interest participated in the meeting.

The Secretariat turned the meeting over to the Chair, Professor Houssin. He also welcomed the Committee and reviewed the objectives and agenda of the meeting.

The WHO Regional Emergency Directors and the Executive Director of the WHO Health Emergencies Programme (WHE) provided regional and the global situation overview. After ensuing discussion, the Committee unanimously agreed that the outbreak still constitutes
a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) and offered advice to the Director-General.

The Director-General declared that the outbreak of COVID-19 continues to constitute a PHEIC. He accepted the advice of the Committee to WHO and issued the Committee’s advice to States Parties as Temporary Recommendations under the IHR.

The Emergency Committee will be reconvened within three months or earlier, at the discretion of the Director-General. The Director-General thanked the Committee for its work.

Advice to WHO

Coordination, planning, and monitoring
- Continue to lead and coordinate the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic in collaboration with countries, the United Nations (UN), and other partners.
- Work with fragile states and vulnerable countries that require additional technical, logistical and commodity support.
- Establish mechanisms to compile lessons learned from country and partner experiences and WHO missions and share the best practices and updated recommendations.
- Provide further guidance to countries about adjusting public health measures, taking into account the different epidemiological situations of the pandemic.
- Promote the inclusion of all interested countries, including low- and middle-income countries from all regions, in the Solidarity clinical trials for therapeutics and vaccines.
- Continue efforts with partners to obtain equitable access to personal protective equipment, diagnostics, and biomedical equipment essential to the pandemic COVID-19 response.
- Continue to coordinate global expert networks in epidemiology, laboratory, vaccines, clinical care, infection prevention and control, social sciences, and operational research; modelling; and other technical support.
One Health
- Work with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and countries to identify the zoonotic source of the virus and the route of introduction to the human population, including
  the possible role of intermediate hosts. This should be accomplished through efforts such as scientific and collaborative field missions, which will enable targeted interventions and a research agenda to reduce the risk of similar events.
- Work closely with OIE and FAO to provide guidance on how to prevent SARS-CoV-2 infections in animals and humans and prevent the establishment of new zoonotic reservoirs.
- Work with partner organizations and countries to strengthen the global food supply chain, protect food workers, properly manage food markets, and mitigate possible disruptions to the food supply.
Essential Health Services
- Support countries to assess and manage the unintended consequences of public health measures implemented to control the COVID-19 pandemic, including gender-based violence and child neglect.
- Support countries to monitor their ability to provide and strengthen essential health services throughout a likely extended COVID-19 response. This should include, but is not limited to, essential prevention for communicable diseases, particularly
  vaccination; services related to reproductive health, including care during pregnancy and childbirth; care of vulnerable populations, such as young infants and older adults; provision of medications and supplies for the ongoing management of chronic
  diseases, including mental health conditions; continuity of critical inpatient therapies; management of emergency health conditions and common acute presentations that require time-sensitive intervention; and auxiliary services, such as basic
  diagnostic imaging, laboratory services, and blood bank services.
- Support countries to address shortages of essential medicines and health products, personal protective equipment, and other medical supplies and to establish sustainable risk management practices to prevent future shortages.
Risk communication and community engagement
- Continue risk communications and community engagement activities through the WHO Information Network for Epidemics (EPI-WIN) and other platforms to counter rumours and misinformation.
- Continue to regularly communicate clear messages, guidance, and advice about the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic, how to reduce transmission, and save lives.
- Work with partners and countries to articulate potential long-term consequences of COVID-19 pandemic, emphasizing the need for strengthened cross-sectoral preparedness, transparency and global coordination.
Surveillance
- Clarify the testing strategy, support countries to increase testing capacity, and aim to provide equitable access to diagnostic tests and supplies in light of market failures and global shortages.
- Continue to provide guidance on monitoring disease trends using Severe Acute Respiratory Infections (SARI) and Influenza Like Illness (ILI) surveillance systems in anticipation of the co-circulation of influenza viruses.
- Develop qualitative and quantitative indicators that countries can use to assess and monitor SARS-CoV-2 transmission at all levels of public health response.
- Continue to support countries and partners by providing technical and operational guidance, training platforms, and tools such as Go.Data,to enhance case identification and contact tracing capacity, strengthen the public health workforce, and engage
  communities for contact tracing.
- Provide clear qualitative and quantitative indicators to monitor SARS-CoV-2 transmission to inform the adjustment of public health and social measures.
Travel and Trade
- Continue working with countries and partners to enable essential travel needed for pandemic response, humanitarian relief, repatriation, and cargo operations.
- Develop strategic guidance with partners for the gradual return to normal operations of passenger travel in a coordinated manner that provides appropriate protection when physical distancing is not feasible.
- Update recommendations on appropriate travel measures and analyze their effects on international transmission of COVID-19, with consideration of the balance between benefits and unintended consequences, including entry and exit screening, education
  of travelers on responsible travel behaviour, case finding, contact tracing, isolation, and quarantine, by incorporating evidence on the potential role of pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic transmission.
To all States Parties

Coordination and Collaboration
- Support WHO leadership and continue to collaborate with WHO at all levels of the organization and with other countries to enable effective global COVID-19 pandemic preparedness and response.
- Participate in global solidarity efforts to enable access to essential supplies for all.
- Document and share lessons learned from efforts to control the pandemic, including the timing, pace, and sequencing of the application and lifting of public health measures.
Preparedness
- Strengthen preparedness for health emergencies, and build resilient health systems, incorporating lessons learned during different stages of the pandemic, and sharing experiences with other countries.
Surveillance
- Work with WHO and multisectoral partners to interrupt transmission by maintaining robust surveillance systems; enhancing capacities for case detection, testing, isolation of cases, contact tracing, quarantine of contacts, and rapid response; strengthening
  the public health workforce; and actively engaging communities for contact tracing, with a particular focus on high risk areas.
- In settings where testing a large proportion of suspected cases is not possible, monitor overall trends; undertake early detection through laboratory confirmation of a limited number of cases with a focus on health workers; and rapidly implement
  public health measures.
- Share with WHO all data necessary to conduct global risk assessments through data platforms, such as the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System and the IHR mechanism. These data should include SARI and ILI where available.
- Use the WHO qualitative and quantitative indicators to assess and monitor SARS-CoV-2 transmission at all levels of public health response.
Additional Health Measures
- Avoid restrictions on international transport of food, medical and other essential supplies and permit the safe movement of essential personnel required for an effective pandemic response.
- Implement appropriate travel measures with consideration of their public health benefits, including entry and exit screening, education of travelers on responsible travel behaviour, case finding, contact tracing, isolation, and quarantine, by
  incorporating evidence on the potential role of pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic transmission.
- Implement and monitor case finding and contact tracing of travellers, using digital tools where appropriate.
- Continue to review travel and trade measures based on regular risk assessments, transmission patterns at origin and destination, cost-benefit analysis, evolution of the pandemic, and new knowledge of COVID-19.
- Engage in global efforts to respond to the challenges of COVID-19 in managing maritime vessels.
- Do not implement trade restrictions beyond those considered to be of public health importance in accordance with relevant international agreements.
- Continue to provide appropriate public health rationale to WHO for additional health measures in accordance with IHR.
Health Workers
- Prioritize the protection of the health workforce through access to training and provision of personal protective equipment, infection prevention and control measures, improved working conditions, application of WHO recommended testing strategies,
  and prevention of stigma and attacks on health workers.
Food Security
- Work with WHO and partners to strengthen the global food supply chain, protect food workers, properly manage food markets, and mitigate possible disruptions to the food supply, especially for vulnerable populations.
One Health
- Promote sound practices to manage risks of trade of live animals in food markets and regulate trade of exotic wildlife.
Risk Communications and Community Engagement
- Continue to engage communities to address rumours and misinformation and keep the public informed, with a focus on vulnerable populations.
Research and development
- Address research gaps such as: routes of transmission, including the role of asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic infection droplet, contact, fomite and aerosol transmission; and viral shedding; and animal source and intermediate hosts, in collaboration
  with partners.
- Continue to support and conduct COVID-19 research, in line with the WHO Research and Development Blueprint, and the road map for COVID-19 vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics.
- Continue sharing full genome sequences to increase global understanding of virus evolution and phylogenetics and their application to public health practices.
Essential Health Services
- Maintain essential health services throughout a likely extended COVID-19 response. This should include essential prevention for communicable diseases, particularly vaccination; services related to reproductive health, including care during pregnancy
  and childbirth; care of vulnerable populations, such as young infants and older adults; provision of medications and supplies for the ongoing management of chronic diseases, including mental health conditions; continuity of critical inpatient
  therapies; management of emergency health conditions and common acute presentations that require time-sensitive intervention; and auxiliary services, such as basic diagnostic imaging, laboratory services, and blood bank services.
- Continue to track and document the impact of COVID-19 on essential health services.
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May 9, 2020
INFOSAN Quarterly Summary, 2020 #1

Food safety incidents

During the first quarter of 2020, the INFOSAN Secretariat was involved in 38 food safety incidents involving 109 WHO Member States and 9 territories of WHO Member States. There were 25 incidents involving a biological hazard (Salmonella spp. [8], Listeria monocytogenes [5], Norovirus [3] Shiga-toxin producing Escherichia coli [2], Clostridium botulinum [2] Bacillus cereus [2], Cronobacter spp. [1], Shigella sonnei [1], unspecified biological hazard [1]), 6 involving an undeclared allergen (milk [3], peanut (1), egg [1], gluten [1]), 5 involving a physical hazard (undetermined foreign matter [2], glass [1], metal [1], plastic [1]), one involving a chemical/toxin hazard (histamine), and one linked to an unspecified hazard.

The food categories that were most commonly involved in the 38 incidents during the first quarter of 2020 involved fish and other seafood (8), herbs and spices (4), legumes and pulses (4), milk and dairy products (3), nuts and oilseeds (3), snacks, desserts and other foods (3), cereals and cereal-based products (2), composite food (2), fruit and fruit products (2), meat and meat products (2), vegetables and vegetable products (2), products of special nutritional use (1), and food for infants and small children (1). One incident involved an unknown food source.

During such international food safety incidents, the INFOSAN Secretariat relies on the swift action of national INFOSAN Emergency Contact Points to respond to requests for information. Rapid sharing of information through INFOSAN enables members to implement appropriate risk management measures to prevent illness in their respective countries.

Geographic scope

The outlined incidents involved Member States from all WHO regions: Europe (39), followed by the Americas (24), Africa (24), the Western Pacific (18), the Eastern Mediterranean (8) and South-East Asia (6).

Recall in several countries of frozen spring roll sheets from Singapore due to the presence of an undeclared allergen

In February 2020, the INFOSAN Secretariat was notified by the European Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) and INFOSAN colleagues in Australia of a recall in Australia and several European countries of frozen spring roll sheets due to the detection of an undeclared allergen (milk), imported from Singapore. In collaboration with RASFF, the INFOSAN Secretariat was informed that the implicated frozen spring roll sheets were distributed internationally to 46 Member States from four WHO regions and 4 territories in Europe and the Western Pacific. Moreover, through engagement with the INFOSAN Emergency Contact Point (ECP) in Singapore, the INFOSAN Secretariat also received details of further distribution of implicated products to additional WHO Member States from all WHO regions, taking the total number of Member States involved to 65. It was also reported that the products involved had been redistributed by some countries to Europe, the Americas and Africa. Consequently, several countries recalled the implicated products to relabel them and investigated the issue to identify illnesses related to the consumption of the implicated frozen spring roll sheets. No illnesses were reported to the INFOSAN Secretariat.

This incident has highlighted undeclared allergens as an important category of hazards that can result in a largescale international response to implement risk management measures and prevent illness. In addition, it exemplified efficient communication among INFOSAN members and the Secretariat.

Outbreak of Listeriosis in the United States of America linked to enoki mushrooms imported from the Republic of Korea

In March 2020, the INFOSAN Secretariat was made aware by the United States (US) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of an outbreak of Listeriosis in the US linked to the consumption of enoki mushrooms, imported from the Republic of Korea. In total, 36 cases including 4 deaths have been reported in the US. Following investigations in Canada, carried out in collaboration with the US, the INFOSAN Secretariat was informed of 6 cases of Listeriosis between 2017 and 2019 in Canada potentially related by whole genome sequencing (WGS) to the ongoing outbreak in the USA. In addition, food isolates (from enoki mushrooms from the Republic of Korea) genetically associated with the cluster of cases have been collected in 2019 by authorities in Canada. The WGS information pertaining to the cases and food isolates were shared on the INFOSAN Community Website to assist the identification of cases in other countries.

The INFOSAN Secretariat engaged the INFOSAN Emergency Contact Point (ECP) in the Republic of Korea to seek details on any further international distribution of the implicated enoki mushrooms. Investigations are ongoing.

News & activities

Food Sector and the COVID-19 outbreak

On 31 December 2019, WHO was alerted to several cases of pneumonia of unknown origin in the city of Wuhan, Hubei Province, China. The virus, a previously unknown coronavirus has been named SARS-CoV-2 and is the cause of the COVID-19 disease.

The WHO Epidemic Information Network (EPI-WIN) aims to share information tailored to specific sectors, including food and agriculture. The INFOSAN Secretariat has recently developed a guidance document for food businesses with regards to COVID-19 and food safety which is now available online. The guidance has also been disseminated through EPI-WIN and presented during two webinars.

Call for applicants: INFOSAN Train-the-Trainer Workshop

In February, the INFOSAN Secretariat issued a call for applications for the INFOSAN Train-the-Trainer workshop. With the constant growth of the network, and the increased need for training that this entails, the INFOSAN Secretariat, in collaboration with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), has announced this workshop which aims to increase the human resources available to train INFOSAN members on a range of INFOSAN-related topics, online or in-person. As a result, it is expected that the understanding of the roles and responsibilities of INFOSAN members will be improved, resulting in greater participation that will enhance speed and efficiency during the response to food safety emergencies at the global level. The INFOSAN Secretariat, together with CFIA, look forward to hosting this important workshop later this year.

Developing the new INFOSAN Community Website

The INFOSAN Community Website (ICW) continues to be an effective tool for the network to disseminate information during food safety emergencies. Over the past year, through the INFOSAN member survey, the Secretariat has gained a better understanding of how members use the ICW and how it can be improved to enhance information sharing. The information collected, together with the experience of members of the Secretariat, has provided numerous innovative ideas to guide the development of the new ICW. The Secretariat is pleased to announce that the competitive process to select the vendor that will develop the new INFOSAN Community Website has concluded and the work on the creation of the new ICW has begun.

Voice of an active network member

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May 9, 2020
Selling with Confidence: How to Keep Revenue and Prices Up

Selling with confidence gives sales professionals the skills and support they need to resist growing pressure to discount prices. Such confidence is more critical than ever because the pressure to discount comes from two sources. First?no surprise?it comes from customers. In today?s world, when demand is slowing and globalization introduces low-cost competitors, existing and new customers are more insistent than ever that sales people discount and then discount some more. The battle to maintain profits by resisting discounting pressures from customers is tough enough without more pressure coming from yet a second source: the sales person?s sales managers and corporate executives.

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April 11, 2020
WhatsApp tightens sharing limits to curb virus misinformation

SAN FRANCISCO: WhatsApp on Tuesday placed new limits on message forwarding as part of an effort to curb the spread of misinformation about the coronavirus pandemic.

The new policy limits users to forwarding certain messages to one “chat” at a time, aiming to limit the rapid propagation of content that is provocative but likely to be false.

The Facebook-owned messaging platform said it took the action to enable people to concentrate on personal and private communications during the health crisis.

In recent weeks, “we’ve seen a significant increase in the amount of forwarding which users have told us can feel overwhelming and can contribute to the spread of misinformation,“ WhatsApp said in a blog post.

“We believe it’s important to slow the spread of these messages down to keep WhatsApp a place for personal conversation.”

Last year, WhatsApp set limits on forwarded messages to five chats at a time, “to constrain virality,“ responding to events in India where the rapid proliferation of unverified information led to mob violence.

The new policy applies to messages forwarded “many times” and marked with a double-arrow, indicating that it did not originate from a close contact, according to WhatsApp.

“In effect, these messages are less personal compared to typical messages sent on WhatsApp,“ the blog said.

“We are now introducing a limit so that these messages can only be forwarded to one chat at a time.”

Damian Collins, a British member of parliament and co-founder of the Infotagion fact-check blog, called the move “a timely intervention,“ noting that WhatsApp was being used to spread recent hoaxes that 5G wireless networks were spreading the virus.

“The online conspiracy theories about #5G exposed last week, and their real-life consequences, are a clear call to fight disinformation about #COVID19,“ Collins tweeted.

“A lot of the false content sent to us at @infotagion came from @WhatsApp.”

Scrambling to stop hoaxes

WhatsApp along with its parent Facebook have been scrambling to curb an explosion of rumors and hoaxes about the coronavirus and at the same time seeking to promote verified content.

With more than a billion users worldwide, WhatsApp has become a key source of information and communication during the pandemic.

Facebook said last month it has nearly doubled server capacity to power WhatsApp as people in isolation place more voice and video calls using the popular messaging service.

But WhatsApp has also been used to spread inaccurate information about the Covid-19 outbreak including about untested treatments.

Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar last month warned people against sharing unverified coronavirus information on the messaging platform.

“These messages are scaring and confusing people and causing real damage. Please get your info from official, trusted sources,“ the leader tweeted.

One problem faced by the messaging service is that the encrypted information is seen only by the sender and recipient, making it harder for fact-checkers to debunk.

WhatsApp said that as part of its efforts to fight the spread of false information, it was working with the World Health Organization and some 20 national health ministries, “to help connect people with accurate information.”

The platform has been funding fact checking organizations and created a Coronavirus Information Hub within the app. – AFP

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April 10, 2020
Medical Product Alert N°4/2020
This Medical Product Alert relates to a number of confirmed falsified chloroquine products circulating in the WHO region of Africa. Please note that this Medical Product Alert n°4/2020 will be updated as new reports of falsified chloroquine are received and validated by WHO.

Between 31 March and 2 April 2020, the WHO global surveillance and monitoring system on substandard and falsified (SF) medical products received nine reports of confirmed falsified chloroquine products from three countries. All reported products were identified at patient level and all have been confirmed as falsified.

This WHO medical product alert N°4/2020 refers to nine different falsified chloroquine products, with different presentations (see Table 1). It is important to note that widespread vigilance is required from all countries, regardless of where the product was originally identified.

Table 1: List of identified falsified chloroquine products, subject of WHO Alert N°4/2020

All the products listed in Table 1 are confirmed as falsified, on the basis that they deliberately/fraudulently misrepresent their identity, composition or source. Indeed, it can be noted that:
- either: the products do not contain the correct amount of the active pharmaceutical ingredient, based on the results of preliminary or full compendial analysis;
- and/or: the products were not produced by the manufacturer whose name is stated on the product labels, and the variable data (batch number and dates) of the above products do not correspond to genuine manufacturing records;
- and/or: the manufacturer whose name is stated on the product labels does not exist.
Chloroquine phosphate or sulfate is referenced on the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines for the treatment of Plasmodium vivax infection (malaria). Large clinical trials are under way to generate the robust data needed to establish the efficacy and safety of chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine in the treatment of COVID-19. These medicines are currently authorized for malaria and certain autoimmune diseases and it is important that patients do not face shortages caused by stockpiling or use outside the authorized indications.
Both chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine can have serious side effects, especially at high doses or when combined with other medicines.

The SOLIDARITY trial, led by WHO, is reviewing potential treatments for COVID-19. Please refer to WHO medical product alert n°3/2020 for general information on falsified medical products in relation to the management
of COVID-19.

For photographs of products listed in Table 1, please refer to the WHO Medical Product Alert website, and
to the annex of this medical product alert n°4/2020 (see pages 3-7).

WHO requests increased vigilance within the supply chains of countries likely to be affected by these falsified products. Increased vigilance should include hospitals, clinics, health centres, wholesalers, distributors, pharmacies and any other suppliers of medical products.

If you are in possession of the above products, please do not use. If you have used these falsified products, or if you suffer an adverse reaction/event having used these products, you are advised to seek immediate medical advice from a qualified healthcare professional, and to report the incident to the National Regulatory Authorities/National Pharmacovigilance Centre.

All medical products must be obtained from licensed, authentic and reliable sources. Their authenticity and condition should be carefully checked. Seek advice from a healthcare professional in case of doubt.

National regulatory/health authorities are advised to immediately notify WHO if these falsified products are discovered in their country. If you have any information concerning the manufacture, distribution, or supply of these products, please contact: rapidalert@who.int.

WHO Global Surveillance and Monitoring System for Substandard and Falsified Medical Products
For more information, please visit: www.who.int/medicines/regulation/ssffc/en/

Annex: Photographs of falsified chloroquine products circulating in the WHO region of Africa, Medical Product Alert N°4/2020

CAMEROON

Photographs of confirmed falsified Chloroquine Phosphate (100mg)

Photographs of confirmed falsified Chloroquine Phosphate (250mg)

Photographs of confirmed falsified Chloroquine Phosphate 250mg

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Photographs of confirmed falsified CLOROQUINE 250MG

Photographs of confirmed falsified Chloroquine Phosphate 250mg

NIGER

Photographs of confirmed falsified Samquine 100 (100mg)

Photographs of confirmed falsified Chloroquine phosphate tablets B.P 100mg

Photographs of confirmed falsified Niruquine (100mg)

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April 10, 2020
WHO Timeline – COVID-19

31 Dec 2019

China reported a cluster of cases of pneumonia in Wuhan, Hubei Province. A novel coronavirus was eventually identified.

1 January 2020

WHO had set up the IMST (Incident Management Support Team) across the three levels of the organization: headquarters, regional headquarters and country level, putting the organization on an emergency footing for dealing with the outbreak.

4 January 2020

WHO reported on social media that there was a cluster of pneumonia cases – with no deaths – in Wuhan, Hubei province.

5 January 2020

WHO published our first Disease Outbreak News on the new virus. This is a flagship technical publication to the scientific and public health community as well as global media. It contained a risk assessment and advice, and reported on what China had told the organization about the status of patients and the public health response on the cluster of pneumonia cases in Wuhan.

10 January 2020

WHO issued a comprehensive package of technical guidance online with advice to all countries on how to detect, test and manage potential cases, based on what was known about the virus at the time.

Evidence at that time suggested there was “no or limited human-to-human transmission.” Based on experience with SARS and MERS and known modes of transmission of respiratory viruses, infection and prevention control guidance were published to protect health workers recommending droplet and contact precautions when caring for patients, and airborne precautions for aerosol generating procedures conducted by health workers.

12 January 2020

China shared the genetic sequence of COVID-19.

13 January 2020

Officials confirm case of COVID-19 in Thailand, the first recorded case outside of China.

14 January 2020

Dr. Maria Van Kerkhove noted in a press briefing there had been limited human-to-human transmission of the coronavirus (in the 41 confirmed cases), mainly through family members, and that there was a risk of a possible wider outbreak. Dr. Kerkhove noted that human-to-human transmission would not be surprising given our experience with SARS, MERS and other respiratory pathogens.

20-21 January 2020

WHO experts from its China and Western Pacific regional offices conducted a brief field visit to Wuhan.

22 January 2020

WHO mission to China issued a statement saying that there was evidence of human-to-human transmission in Wuhan but more investigation was needed to understand the full extent of transmission.

22- 23 January 2020

The WHO Director- General convened an Emergency Committee (EC) under the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) to assess whether the outbreak constituted a public health emergency of international concern. The independent members from around the world could not reach a consensus based on the evidence available at the time. They asked to be reconvened within 10 days after receiving more information.

28 January 2020

A senior WHO delegation led by the Director-General travelled to Beijing to meet China’s leadership, learn more about China’s response, and to offer any technical assistance.

While in Beijing, Dr. Tedros agreed with Chinese government leaders that an international team of leading scientists would travel to China on a mission to better understand the context, the overall response, and exchange information and experience.

11-12 February 2020

WHO convened a Research and Innovation Forum on COVID-19, attended by more than 400 experts and funders from around the world, which included presentations by George Gao, Director General of China CDC, and Zunyou Wu, China CDC’s chief epidemiologist.

16-24 February 2020

The WHO-China Joint mission, which included experts from Canada, Germany, Japan, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore and the US (CDC, NIH) spent time in Beijing and also travelled to Wuhan and two other cities. They spoke with health officials, scientists and health workers in health facilities (maintaining physical distancing). The report of the joint mission can be found here: https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf

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April 9, 2020
Statement of the Twenty-Fourth IHR Emergency Committee
The Twenty-fourth meeting of the Emergency Committee under the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) on the international spread of poliovirus was convened by the Director General on 26 March 2020 with committee members only attending
via teleconference, supported by the WHO Secretariat. In order to ease the burden on affected State Parties in the exceptional situation following the determination of the COVID-19 outbreak as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern
(PHEIC) on 30 January 2020, characterized as a pandemic on 11 March 2020, the invited State Parties were asked to present their reports electronically only instead of attending via teleconference. Reports were received from Afghanistan, Burkina
Faso, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), Ethiopia, Ghana, Pakistan, and Philippines.

The Emergency Committee reviewed the data on wild poliovirus (WPV1) and circulating vaccine derived polioviruses (cVDPV). The WHO Secretariat presented a report of progress for affected IHR States Parties subject to Temporary Recommendations.

Wild poliovirus

The Committee remains gravely concerned by the significant increase in WPV1 cases globally in 2019 and 2020, with 175 cases in 2019 compared to 33 in 2018, and already 32 cases as at 17 March 2020, compared to six for the same period in 2019, with no
significant success yet in reversing this trend.

In Pakistan transmission continues to be widespread, as indicated by both acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance and environmental sampling. While the issues of vaccine hesitancy and refusals by individuals and communities and problems with management
of the national polio program are being addressed, these are yet to have impact on the current worrying epidemiology. The added pressure on the program due to detection of cVDPV2 and ongoing spread in several provinces (see below) has continued
into 2020.

In Afghanistan, the security situation remains very challenging. Inaccessibility and missed children particularly in the Southern Region have led to a large cohort of susceptible children in this part of Afghanistan. The risk of a major upsurge
of cases is growing, with other parts of the country that have been free of WPV1 for some time now at risk of outbreaks. This would again increase the risk of international spread.

The Committee noted that based on sequencing of viruses, there were recent instances of international spread of viruses from Pakistan to Afghanistan and also from Afghanistan to Pakistan. The recent increased frequency of WPV1 international
spread between the two countries suggests that rising transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan correlates with increasing risk of WPV1 exportation beyond the single epidemiological block formed by the two countries.

The Committee noted the continued cooperation and coordination between Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly in reaching high risk mobile populations that frequently cross the international border and welcomed the all-age vaccination now being taken
at key border points between the two countries.

Vaccine derived poliovirus (VDPV)

The multiple cirulating VDPV (cVDPV) outbreaks in four WHO regions (African, Eastern Mediterranean, South-east Asian and Western Pacific Regions) are very concerning, with two new countries reporting outbreaks since the last meeting (Malaysia and Burkina
Faso). Unlike historical experience, cross border spread of cVDPV2 has become quite common, with recent spread from Angola to DR Congo and Zambia, and from Chad and CAR to Cameroon, and from Ghana to Burkina Faso. In addition, local emergences
attributable to mOPV2 use have recently occurred in Togo, Chad and Ethiopia.

The Committee noted that the GPEI has published a strategy to address cVDPV2 outbreaks but was extremely concerned that the monovalent OPV2 stockpile was still depleted. The Committee strongly supports the development and proposed Emergency Use
Listing of the novel OPV2 vaccine which should become available mid-2020, and which it is hoped will result in no or very little seeding of further outbreaks.

Impact of COVID-19

The Committee noted the very recent policy guidance of the GPEI:
- GPEI recommendations for countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. This document summarizes the recommendations from the Polio Oversight Board meeting on 24 March 2020 which calls for postponement of both preventive and outbreak response campaigns,
  while ensuring surveillance and nOPV2 development and roll out plans continue in full.
- The COVID-19 Polio programme continuity plan. The operational guide was developed in collaboration with the regional polio eradication teams and the GPEI Partners to ensure essential GPEI functions continue, polio programme personnel and staff are
  kept safe, and to plan for a fast and effective resumption of polio eradication activities including supplementary immunization activities as soon as the public health situation with COVID-19 allows.
The Committee is extremely concerned about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the risk of heightened transmission of polio and consequently the potential for international spread and significant reversal of polio eradication.

Conclusion

The Committee unanimously agreed that the risk of international spread of poliovirus remains a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) and recommended the extension of Temporary Recommendations for a further three months. However
noting that some if not many international borders are closed to prevent international spread of COVID-19, State Parties may not currently be able to enforce the Temporary Recommendations in all places. The Committee strongly urges countries
subject to these recommendations to maintain a high state of readiness to implement them as soon as possible ensuring the continued safety of travelers as well as health professionals . The Committee recognizes the concerns regarding the lengthy
duration of the polio PHEIC, but concludes that the current situation is extraordinary, with clear ongoing risk of international spread and ongoing need for coordinated international response. The Committee considered the following factors in reaching
this conclusion:
- Rising risk of WPV1 international spread: The progress made in recent years appears to have reversed, with the Committee’s assessment that the risk of international spread is at the highest point
  since 2014 when the PHEIC was declared. This risk assessment is based on the following:
  - the WPV1 exportation in 2019 from Pakistan to Iran and to Afghanistan, and more recently spread from Afghanistan to Pakistan;
  - ongoing rise in the number of WPV1 cases and positive environmental samples in Pakistan, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan;
  - the quickly increasing cohort of unvaccinated children in Afghanistan, with the risk of a major outbreak imminent if nothing is done to access these children;
  - the urgent need to overhaul the leadership and strategy of the program in Pakistan, which although already commenced, is likely take some time to lead to more effective control of transmission
    and ultimately eradication;
  - increasing community and individual resistance to the polio program.
- Rising risk of cVDPV international spread: The clearly documented increased spread in recent months of cVDPV2 demonstrate the unusual nature of the current situation, as international spread of cVDPV
  in the past has been very infrequent. The number of new emergences of cVDPV2 in Africa raises further concern. The risk of new outbreaks in new countries is considered extremely high, even probable.
- COVID-19: This new and unprecedented pandemic is likely to substantially negatively impact the polio eradication program and outbreak control efforts. There is a risk of exportation of both
  WPV1 and cVDPV to known high risk countries, to which it may take a lot of time and effort to adequately respond.
- Falling PV2 immunity: Global population mucosal immunity to type 2 polioviruses (PV2) continues to fall, as the cohort of children born after OPV2 withdrawal grows, exacerbated by poor coverage
  with IPV particularly in some of the cVDPV infected countries.
- Multiple outbreaks: The evolving and unusual epidemiology resulting in rapid emergence and evolution of cVDPV2 strains is extraordinary and not yet fully understood and represents an additional risk
  that is yet to be quantified.
- Weak routine immunization: Many countries have weak immunization systems that can be further impacted by various humanitarian emergencies including COVID19, and the number of countries in which immunization
  systems have been weakened or disrupted by conflict and complex emergencies poses a growing risk, leaving populations in these fragile states vulnerable to outbreaks of polio.
- Surveillance gaps: The appearance of highly diverged VDPVs in the Philippines, Somalia and Indonesia are examples of inadequate polio surveillance, heightening concerns that transmission could be missed
  in various countries. Furthermore, the missed transmission in China for a year illustrates that even countries with generally good surveillance can miss VDPV transmission. COVID-19 is likely to have a negative impact on polio surveillance
  also.
- Lack of access: Inaccessibility continues to be a major risk, particularly in several countries currently infected with WPV or cVDPV, i.e. Afghanistan, Nigeria, Niger, Somalia and Myanmar, which all
  have sizable populations that have been unreached with polio vaccine for prolonged periods.
- Population movement: The risk is amplified by population movement, whether for family, social, economic or cultural reasons, or in the context of populations displaced by insecurity and returning refugees.
  There is a need for international coordination to address these risks. A regional approach and strong crossborder cooperation is required to respond to these risks, as much international spread of polio occurs over land borders.
Risk categories

The Committee provided the Director-General with the following advice aimed at reducing the risk of international spread of WPV1 and cVDPVs, based on the risk stratification as follows:
- States infected with WPV1, cVDPV1 or cVDPV3, with potential risk of international spread.
- States infected with cVDPV2, with potential risk of international spread.
- States no longer infected by WPV1 or cVDPV, but which remain vulnerable to re-infection by WPV or cVDPV.
Criteria to assess States as no longer infected by WPV1 or cVDPV:
- Poliovirus Case: 12 months after the onset date of the most recent case PLUS one month to account for case detection, investigation, laboratory testing and reporting period OR when all reported AFP cases with onset within 12 months of last case have been tested for polio and excluded for WPV1 or cVDPV, and environmental or other samples collected within 12 months of the last case have also tested negative, whichever is the longer.
- Environmental or other isolation of WPV1 or cVDPV (no poliovirus case): 12 months after collection of the most recent positive environmental or other sample (such as from a healthy child) PLUS one month to account for the laboratory testing and reporting period
- These criteria may be varied for the endemic countries, where more rigorous assessment is needed in reference to surveillance gaps (e.g. Borno State, Nigeria)
Once a country meets these criteria as no longer infected, the country will be considered vulnerable for a further 12 months. After this period, the country will no longer be subject to Temporary Recommendations, unless the Committee has concerns based on the final report.

TEMPORARY RECOMMENDATIONS

States infected with WPV1, cVDPV1 or cVDPV3 with potential risk of international spread

WPV1

Afghanistan                               (most recent detection 25 February 2020)

Pakistan                                                (most recent detection 2 March 2020)

Nigeria                                      (most recent detection 27 Sept 2016)

cVDPV1

Malaysia                                     (most recent detection 26 October 2019)

Myanmar                                   (most recent detection 9 August 2019)

Philippines                                 (most recent detection 28 October 2019)

These countries should:
- Officially declare, if not already done, at the level of head of state or government, that the interruption of poliovirus transmission is a national public health emergency and implement all required measures to support polio eradication; where such declaration has already been made, this emergency status should be maintained as long as the response is required.
- Ensure that all residents and longterm visitors (i.e. > four weeks) of all ages, receive a dose of bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV) or inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) between four weeks and 12 months prior to international travel.
- Ensure that those undertaking urgent travel (i.e. within four weeks), who have not received a dose of bOPV or IPV in the previous four weeks to 12 months, receive a dose of polio vaccine at least by the time of departure as this will still provide benefit, particularly for frequent travelers.
- Ensure that such travelers are provided with an International Certificate of Vaccination or Prophylaxis in the form specified in Annex 6 of the IHR to record their polio vaccination and serve as proof of vaccination.
- Restrict at the point of departure the international travel of any resident lacking documentation of appropriate polio vaccination. These recommendations apply to international travelers from all points of departure, irrespective of the means of conveyance (e.g. road, air, sea).
- Further intensify crossborder efforts by significantly improving coordination at the national, regional and local levels to substantially increase vaccination coverage of travelers crossing the border and of high risk crossborder populations. Improved coordination of crossborder efforts should include closer supervision and monitoring of the quality of vaccination at border transit points, as well as tracking of the proportion of travelers that are identified as unvaccinated after they have crossed the border.
- Further intensify efforts to increase routine immunization coverage, including sharing coverage data, as high routine immunization coverage is an essential element of the polio eradication strategy, particularly as the world moves closer to eradication.
- Maintain these measures until the following criteria have been met: (i) at least six months have passed without new infections and (ii) there is documentation of full application of high quality eradication activities in all infected and high risk areas; in the absence of such documentation these measures should be maintained until the state meets the above assessment criteria for being no longer infected.
- Provide to the Director-General a regular report on the implementation of the Temporary Recommendations on international travel.
States infected with cVDPV2s, with potential or demonstrated risk of international spread

Afghanistan           (most recent detection 8 January 2020)

Angola                      (most recent detection 9 February 2020)

Benin                        (most recent detection 9 December 2020)

Burkina Faso          (most recent detection 11 January 2020)

Cameroon              (most recent detection 30 January 2020)

CAR                           (most recent detection 5 February 2020)

Chad                         (most recent detection 5 February 2020)

Cote d’Ivoire          (most recent detection 11 February 2020)

China                        (most recent detection 25 April 2019)

DR Congo                 (most recent detection 22 January 2020)

Ethiopia                (most recent detection 21 February 2020)

Ghana                      (most recent detection 28 January 2020)

Malaysia                 (most recent detection 18 January 2020)

Niger                         (most recent detection 3 April 2019)

Nigeria                  (most recent detection1 January 2020)

Pakistan                   (most recent detection 12 February 2020)

Philippines              (most recent detection 16 January 2020)

Somalia                    (most recent detection 4 February 2020)

Togo                          (most recent detection 10 January 2020)

Zambia                     (most recent detection 25 November 2019)

These countries should:
- Officially declare, if not already done, at the level of head of state or government, that the interruption of poliovirus transmission is a national public health emergency and implement all required measures to support polio eradication; where such declaration has already been made, this emergency status should be maintained.
- Noting the existence of a separate mechanism for responding to type 2 poliovirus infections, consider requesting vaccines from the global mOPV2 stockpile based on the recommendations of the Advisory Group on mOPV2.
- Encourage residents and longterm visitors to receive a dose of IPV four weeks to 12 months prior to international travel; those undertaking urgent travel (i.e. within four weeks) should be encouraged to receive a dose at least by the time of departure.
- Ensure that travelers who receive such vaccination have access to an appropriate document to record their polio vaccination status.
- Intensify regional cooperation and crossborder coordination to enhance surveillance for prompt detection of poliovirus, and vaccinate refugees, travelers and crossborder populations, according to the advice of the Advisory Group.
- Further intensify efforts to increase routine immunization coverage, including sharing coverage data, as high routine immunization coverage is an essential element of the polio eradication strategy, particularly as the world moves closer to eradication.
- Maintain these measures until the following criteria have been met: (i) at least six months have passed without the detection of circulation of VDPV2 in the country from any source, and (ii) there is documentation of full application of high quality eradication activities in all infected and high risk areas; in the absence of such documentation these measures should be maintained until the state meets the criteria of a ‘state no longer infected’.
- At the end of 12 months without evidence of transmission, provide a report to the Director-General on measures taken to implement the Temporary Recommendations.
States no longer infected by WPV1 or cVDPV, but which remain vulnerable to re-infection by WPV or cVDPV

WPV1
- none
  cVDPV
  - Kenya cVDPV2 (last env positive specimen 21 March 2018)
  - Mozambique cVDPV2 (last virus detected 17 December 2018)
  - PNG cVDPV1 (last environmental positive specimen 6 November 2018)
  - Indonesia cVDPV1 (last virus detected 13 February 2019)
These countries should:
- Urgently strengthen routine immunization to boost population immunity.
- Enhance surveillance quality, including considering introducing supplementary methods such as environmental surveillance, to reduce the risk of undetected WPV1 and cVDPV transmission, particularly among high risk mobile and vulnerable populations.
- Intensify efforts to ensure vaccination of mobile and crossborder populations, Internally Displaced Persons, refugees and other vulnerable groups.
- Enhance regional cooperation and cross border coordination to ensure prompt detection of WPV1 and cVDPV, and vaccination of high risk population groups.
- Maintain these measures with documentation of full application of high quality surveillance and vaccination activities.
- At the end of 12 months without evidence of reintroduction of WPV1 or new emergence and circulation of cVDPV, provide a report to the Director-General on measures taken to implement the Temporary Recommendations.
Additional considerations

Impact of COVID-19 on the polio program:
- The committee urges all countries, but particularly those at high risk of polio, to maintain a high level of polio surveillance throughout the pandemic period, noting that the postponement of polio immunization campaigns whether preventive or in response to outbreaks may lead to an increase in polio transmission including international spread. Maintainenance of access to laboratory diagnosis in the face of widespread transport and shipping disruption is critical.
- Secondly, countries affected by campaign postponement should strive to maintain a high degree of operational readiness in order that immunization activities, including border vaccination, can resume quickly adhering to principles of good hygiene and safety for the vaccinee as well as for the health professionals to prevent COVID-19 spread. This includes ensuring teams have access to appropriate personal protective equipment.
- Given the risk of international spread, countries need to ensure that they are ready to use appropriate vaccines, as recommended by the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization, in response to new outbreaks.
- The committee urged countries to maximize the use of polio assets to synergistically address the COVID19 pandemic, noting that polio affected countries may be vulnerable to poorer outcomes in the pandemic due to health care system fragility and poorer health status of the population generally.
- Lastly the pandemic should serve as a reminder to high risk countries with poor immunization coverage that infectious disease outbreaks can lead to social and economic disruption as well as straining the health care system, and countries can increase their population resilience and recovery through prioiritising robust immunization programmes. This is relevant not only to polio, but to all other vaccine preventable diseases particularly measles.
Based on the current situation regarding WPV1 and cVDPV, and the reports provided by affected countries, the Director-General accepted the Committee’s assessment and on 7 April 2020 determined that the situation relating to poliovirus continues to constitute a PHEIC, with respect to WPV1 and cVDPV. The Director-General endorsed the Committee’s recommendations for countries meeting the definition for ‘States infected with WPV1, cVDPV1 or cVDPV3 with potential risk for international spread’, ‘States infected with cVDPV2 with potential risk for international spread’ and for ‘States no longer infected by WPV1 or cVDPV, but which remain vulnerable to re-infection by WPV or cVDPV’ and extended the Temporary Recommendations under the IHR to reduce the risk of the international spread of poliovirus, effective 7 April 2020.

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April 9, 2020
EXCLUSIVE: Ondo Government Asks Sacked Nurses To Deny SaharaReporters’ Story Before Being Reinstated Into Service

Following several stories by SaharaReporters on the unjust sacking of six nurses attached to the University of Medical Sciences Teaching Hospital, Ondo State, the state government has now told the affected persons to deny the reports by the online news publication before being reinstated into service.

In a letter signed by Adeeyo Babatunde, Director of Administration for the Chief Medical Director, Dr Oluwole Ige, and seen by SaharaReporters, the management of the hospital gave a number of other stringent conditions to five of the affected individuals before they are to be reinstated.

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EXCLUSIVE: Ondo Government Sacks Nurses For Demanding Payment Of Accumulated Salaries

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The letter reads, “The management of the teaching hospital has considered your letter of apology on the matter and has approved your re-absorption into the services of the teaching hospital on the following conditions:

“That you submit two letters from two guarantors that are not less than the grade of a director in the state public service.

“That you submit a letter that you would be of a good conduct while in the service of the teaching hospital.

“That you should show evidence of your rebuttal of the malicious publications currently circulating in an online news media.

“Please note that the effective date of your re-absorption shall be the date you resume duty in your department and the period of your absence will be treated as leave without pay.

“By this letter, you are hereby instructed to report back to your department after complying with the above stated conditions.”

Recall that after forcefully removing them from service for protesting the non-payment of their salaries, the hospital’s management also coerced them into writing letters of apology after SaharaReporters exposed the injustice and victimisation of the affected nurses.

The latest twist is however, another way the hospital’s management intends to put fear into the affected nurses to prevent them from demanding their rights while still in the employ of the state government.

A source on Tuesday confirmed to SaharaReporters that the nurses were summoned to the office of the CMD a few days ago where the letters containing the new conditions were listed.

“Although, I cannot really state the outcome of the meeting between the sacked nurses and the management last week, but I am sure it was because of the story over their (affected nurses) sack by the hospital. The management was not really happy about it especially the bashing from the public.

“Out of the six nurses that were sacked by the management, the hospital still refused to reinstate one of the guys among identified as Peace.

“He is one of the best hands in his department at the hospital but he is being victimised to leading others to demand for their rights.

“The hospital’s management is committing this evil despite an order from Governor Rotimi Akeredolu for the nurses to be unconditionally reinstated.”

One of the affected nurses, who spoke with our correspondent, said he has rejected the conditions attached to the reinstatement.

He said, “They gave five of us the letters and left one person out but as for me, I see those conditions as a way to further punish us for demanding for our rights.”

CMD of the hospital, Dr Ige, did not respond to calls or text messages sent to him when contacted by SaharaReporters to react to the issue.

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April 8, 2020