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  • UK PM listened to his scientists about Covid-19, but they were slow to sound the alarm

    UK PM listened to his scientists about Covid-19, but they were slow to sound the alarm

    UK PM listened to his scientists about Covid-19, but they were slow to sound the alarm 1

    LONDON: It was early spring when British scientists laid out the bald truth to their government. It was “highly likely,“ they said, that there was now “sustained transmission” of COVID-19 in the United Kingdom.

    If unconstrained and if the virus behaved as in China, up to four-fifths of Britons could be infected and one in a hundred might die, wrote the scientists, members of an official committee set up to model the spread of pandemic flu, on March 2. Their assessment didn’t spell it out, but that was a prediction of over 500,000 deaths in this nation of nearly 70 million.

    Yet the next day, March 3, Prime Minister Boris Johnson was his cheery self. He joked that he was still shaking hands with everyone, including at a hospital treating coronavirus patients.

    “Our country remains extremely well prepared,“ Johnson said as Italy reached 79 deaths. “We already have a fantastic NHS,“ the national public health service, “fantastic testing systems and fantastic surveillance of the spread of disease.”

    Alongside him at the Downing Street press conference was Chris Whitty, the government’s chief medical adviser and himself an epidemiologist. Whitty passed on the modelling committee’s broad conclusions, including the prediction of a possible 80% infection rate and the consequent deaths. But he played them down, saying the number of people who would be infected was probably “a lot lower” and coming up with a total was “largely speculative.”

    The upbeat tone of that briefing stood in sharp contrast with the growing unease of many of the government’s scientific advisers behind the scenes. They were already convinced that Britain was on the brink of a disastrous outbreak, a Reuters investigation has found.

    Interviews with more than 20 British scientists, key officials and senior sources in Johnson’s Conservative Party, and a study of minutes of advisory committee meetings and public testimony and documents, show how these scientific advisers concluded early the virus could be devastating.

    But the interviews and documents also reveal that for more than two months, the scientists whose advice guided Downing Street did not clearly signal their worsening fears to the public or the government. Until March 12, the risk level, set by the government’s top medical advisers on the recommendation of the scientists, remained at “moderate,“ suggesting only the possibility of a wider outbreak.

    “You know, there’s a small little cadre of people in the middle, who absolutely did realise what was going on, and likely to happen,“ said John Edmunds, a professor of infectious disease modelling and a key adviser to the government, known for his work on tracking Ebola. Edmunds was among those who did call on the government to elevate the warning level earlier.

    From the outset, said Edmunds, work by scientists had shown that, with only limited interventions, the virus would trigger an “overwhelming epidemic” in which Britain’s health service was not going “to get anywhere near being able to cope with it. That was clear from the beginning.”

    But he said: “I do think there’s a bit of a worry in terms you don’t want to unnecessarily panic people.”

    Johnson, who himself has sickened with the virus, moved more slowly than the leaders of many other prosperous countries to adopt a lockdown. He has been criticised for not moving more swiftly to organise mass tests and mobilise supplies of life-saving equipment and beds. Johnson was hospitalized on April 5 and moved to intensive care the next day.

    It is too soon to judge the ultimate soundness of the UK’s early response. If history concludes that it was lacking, then the criticism levelled at the prime minister may be that, rather than ignoring the advice of his scientific advisers, he failed to question their assumptions.

    Interviews and records published so far suggest that the scientific committees that advised Johnson didn’t study, until mid-March, the option of the kind of stringent lockdown adopted early on in China, where the disease arose in December, and then followed by much of Europe and finally by Britain itself. The scientists’ reasoning: Britons, many of them assumed, simply wouldn’t accept such restrictions.

    The UK scientists were also mostly convinced – and many still are – that, once the new virus escaped China, quarantine measures would likely not succeed. Minutes of technical committees reviewed by Reuters indicate that almost no attention was paid to preparing a programme of mass testing. Other minutes and interviews show Britain was following closely a well-laid plan to fight a flu pandemic – not this deadlier disease. The scientists involved, however, deny that the flu focus ultimately made much difference.

    Now, as countries debate how to combat the virus, some experts here say, the lesson from the British experience may be that governments and scientists worldwide must increase the transparency of their planning so that their thinking and assumptions are open to challenge.

    John Ashton, a clinician and former regional director of Public Health England, the government agency overseeing healthcare, said the government’s advisers took too narrow a view and hewed to limited assumptions. They were too “narrowly drawn as scientists from a few institutions,“ he said. Their handling of COVID-19, Ashton said, shows the need for a broader approach. “In the future we need a much wider group of independent advisers.”

    Michael Cates, who succeeded Stephen Hawking as Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge University, is leading an initiative by the Royal Society, the UK’s leading scientific body, to bring modellers in from other scientific disciplines to help understand the epidemic.

    “Without faulting anyone so far, it’s vital, where there is such a lot at stake, to throw the maximum possible light on the methods, assumptions and data built into our understanding of how this epidemic will develop,“ he told Reuters.

    In a statement to Reuters, a spokesperson for the Department of Health and Social Care said the government was delivering “a science-led action plan” to contain the outbreak. “As the public would expect, we regularly test our pandemic plans and what we learned from previous exercises has helped us to rapidly respond to COVID-19.”

    A LOW RISK TO THE PUBLIC

    When news came from China in January of a new infectious disease, Johnson had reason to believe his country was well prepared. It had some of the world’s best scientists and a well-drilled plan to deal with potentially lethal pandemics. Perhaps, some scientists say in hindsight, the plan made them slow to adapt.

    For many years, the Cabinet Office – a collection of officials who act as the prime minister’s direct arm to run the government – took the threat of pandemics seriously. Presciently, it rated pandemics as the Number 1 threat to the country, ahead of terrorism and financial crashes.

    At the centre of planning was a small group of scientists, among them Edmunds. His research group at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine runs one of the two computer modelling centres for epidemics that have mostly driven government policy. The other is at nearby Imperial College. Edmunds remembers that early in the outbreak, the data from China were sketchy, in the period “where the Chinese were trying to pretend that this wasn’t transmissible between humans.”

    Edmunds and his colleague at Imperial, Neil Ferguson, were part of an alphabet soup of committees that fed advice into the Cabinet Office machinery around the prime minister. Both were founders of the flu pandemic modelling committee, known as SPI-M, that produced the March 2 report warning of more than 500,000 deaths. This committee had met together for nearly 15 years.

    Ferguson did not respond to a request to be interviewed for this article.

    Edmunds and Ferguson were also part of NERVTAG, the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group. Both too were members of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies, known as SAGE, that advises the government in times of crisis. SAGE reports directly to Johnson and the government’s main emergency committee, COBRA.

    At first, when NERVTAG met on January 13, it studied information from China that there was “no evidence of significant human to human transmission” of the new virus, according to minutes of the meeting. The scientists agreed the risk to the UK population was “very low.”

    The evidence soon changed, but this wasn’t reflected in the official threat level. By the end of January, scientists in China began releasing clinical data. Case studies published in the British medical journal, The Lancet, showed 17% of the first 99 coronavirus cases needed critical care. Eleven patients died. Another Chinese study, in the same magazine, warned starkly of a global spread and urged: “Preparedness plans and mitigation interventions should be readied for quick deployment globally.”

    Edmunds recalled that “from about mid January onwards, it was absolutely obvious that this was serious, very serious.” Graham Medley, a professor of infectious diseases modelling at the London School and chairman of SPI-M, agreed. He said that the committee was “clear that this was going to be big from the first meeting.” At the end of January, his committee moved into “wartime” mode, he said, reporting directly into SAGE.

    Dr Jon Read, a senior lecturer in biostatistics at the University of Lancaster, also a member of SPI-M, said by the end of January it was apparent the virus had “pandemic potential” and that death rates for the elderly were brutal. “From my perspective within the sort of modelling community, everybody’s aware of this, and we’re saying that this is probably going to be pretty bad,“ he said.

    But the scientists did not articulate their fears forcefully to the government, minutes of committee meetings reveal.

    On January 21, scientists on NERVTAG endorsed the elevation of the UK risk warning from COVID-19 from “very low” to “low.” SAGE met formally for the first time the following day about the coronavirus threat. So did COBRA, which was chaired by Matt Hancock, the health secretary, who would contract the virus himself in late March. He told reporters after the meeting: “The clinical advice is that the risk to the public remains low.”

    In response to questions from Reuters, the government’s Department of Health declined to clarify how the risk levels are defined or what action, if any, they trigger. In a statement, a spokesperson said: “Increasing the risk level in the UK is a belt and braces measure which allows the government to plan for all future eventualities.”

    Two days later, China put the city of Wuhan, where the outbreak began, into a complete lockdown. Hubei, the surrounding province, would follow. But already, 17 passenger flights had flown directly from Wuhan to Britain since the start of 2020, and 614 flights from the whole of China, according to FlightRadar24, a flight-tracking service. That meant thousands of Chinese, some of them potential carriers, had come to Britain. On April 5, scientific adviser Ferguson said he estimated only one-third of infected people reaching Britain had been detected.

    As they watched China impose its lockdown, the British scientists assumed that such drastic actions would never be acceptable in a democracy like the UK. Among those modelling the outbreak, such stringent counter-measures were not, at first, examined.

    “We had milder interventions in place,“ said Edmunds, because no one thought it would be acceptable politically “to shut the country down.” He added: “We didn’t model it because it didn’t seem to be on the agenda. And Imperial (College) didn’t look at it either.” The NERVTAG committee agreed, noting in its minutes that tough measures in the short term would be pointless, as they “would only delay the UK outbreak, not prevent it.”

    That limited approach mirrored the UK’s longstanding pandemic flu strategy. The Department of Health declined a request from Reuters for a copy of its updated pandemic plan, without providing a reason. But a copy of the 2011 “UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011,“ which a spokesman said was still relevant, stated the “working presumption will be that Government will not impose any such restrictions. The emphasis will instead be on encouraging all those who have symptoms to follow the advice to stay at home and avoid spreading their illness.”

    According to one senior Conservative Party politician, who was officially briefed as the crisis unfolded, the close involvement in the response to the coronavirus of the same scientific advisers and civil servants who drew up the flu plan may have created a “cognitive bias.”

    “We had in our minds that COVID-19 was a nasty flu and needed to be treated as such,“ he said. “The implication was it was a disease that could not be stopped and that it was ultimately not that deadly.”

    While the UK was prepared to fight the flu, places in Asia like China, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea had built their pandemic plans with lessons learned from fighting the more lethal SARS outbreak that began in 2002, he said. SARS had a fatality rate of up to 14%. As a result, these countries, he said, were more ready to resort to widespread testing, lockdowns and other draconian measures to keep their citizens from spreading the virus.

    Scientists involved in the UK response disagree that following the government’s flu plan clouded their thinking or influenced the outbreak’s course. The plan had a “reasonable worst case” scenario as devastating as the worst predictions for COVID-19, they note.

    Mark Woolhouse, a professor of infectious diseases epidemiology at the University of Edinburgh, and a member of the SPI-M committee, said COVID-19 did behave differently than an expected pandemic flu – for example school closures proved to be far less effective in slowing the spread of the coronavirus. But, broadly, “the government has been consistently responsive to changing facts.”

    By the end of January, the government’s chief medical adviser, Whitty, was explaining to politicians in private, according to at least two people who spoke to him, that if the virus escaped China, it would in time infect the great majority of people in Britain. It could only be slowed down, not stopped. On Jan 30, the government raised the threat level to “moderate” from “low.”

    The country’s medical officers “consider it prudent for our governments to escalate planning and preparation in case of a more widespread outbreak,“ a statement said at the time. Whitty did not respond to questions from Reuters for this article.

    A TIME TO PREPARE

    On the evening of January 31, Boris Johnson sat before a fireplace in 10 Downing Street and told the nation, in a televised address: “This is the moment when the dawn breaks and the curtain goes up on a new act in our great national drama.”

    He was talking of finally delivering Brexit, or what he called “this recaptured sovereignty.” Until that moment, Johnson’s premiership had been utterly absorbed by delivering on that challenge.

    With Brexit done, Johnson had the chance to focus on other matters the following month, among them the emerging virus threat. But leaving the European Union had a consequence.

    Between February 13 and March 30, Britain missed a total of eight conference calls or meetings about the coronavirus between EU heads of state or health ministers – meetings that Britain was still entitled to join. Although Britain did later make an arrangement to attend lower-level meetings of officials, it had missed a deadline to participate in a common purchase scheme for ventilators, to which it was invited. Ventilators, vitally important to treating the direst cases of COVID-19, have fallen into short supply globally. Johnson’s spokesman blamed an administrative error.

    A Downing Street aide told Reuters that from around the end of January, Johnson concentrated his attention increasingly on the coronavirus threat, receiving “very frequent” updates at least once per day from mid February, either in person or via a daily dashboard of cases.

    In the medical and scientific world, there was growing concern about the threat of the virus to the UK. A report from Exeter University, published on February 12, warned a UK outbreak could peak within four months and, without mitigation, infect 45 million people.

    That worried Rahuldeb Sarkar, a consultant physician in respiratory medicine and critical care in the county of Kent, who foresaw that intensive care beds could be swamped. Even if disease transmission was reduced by half, he wrote in a report aimed at clinicians and actuaries in mid-February, a coronavirus outbreak in the UK would “have a chance of overwhelming the system.”

    With Whitty stating in a BBC interview on February 13 that a UK outbreak was still an “if, not a when,“ Richard Horton, a medical doctor and editor of the Lancet, said the government and public health service wasted an opportunity that month to prepare quarantine restriction measures and a programme of mass tests, and procure resources like ventilators and personal protective equipment for expanded intensive care.

    Calling the lost chance a “national scandal” in a later editorial, he would testify to parliament about a mismatch between “the urgent warning that was coming from the frontline in China” and the “somewhat pedestrian evaluation” of the threat from the scientific advice to the government.

    After developing a test for the new virus by January 10, health officials adopted a centralised approach to its deployment, initially assigning a single public laboratory in north London to perform the tests. But, according to later government statements, there was no wider plan envisaged to make use of hundreds of laboratories across the country, both public and private, that could have been recruited.

    According to emails and more than a dozen scientists interviewed by Reuters, the government issued no requests to labs for assistance with staff or testing equipment until the middle of March, when many abruptly received requests to hand over nucleic acid extraction instruments, used in testing. An executive at the Weatherall Institute of Molecular Medicine at the University of Oxford said he could have carried out up to 1,000 tests per day from February. But the call never came.

    “You would have thought that they would be bashing down the door,“ said the executive, who spoke on condition of anonymity. By April 5, Britain had carried out 195,524 tests, in contrast to at least 918,000 completed a week earlier in Germany.

    Nor was there an effective effort to expand the supply of ventilators. The Department of Health told Reuters in a statement that the government started talking to manufacturers of ventilators about procuring extra supplies in February. But it was not until March 16, after it was clear supplies could run out, that Johnson launched an appeal to industry to help ramp up production.

    Charles Bellm, managing director of Intersurgical, a global supplier of medical ventilation products based outside London, said he has been contacted by more than a dozen governments around the world, including France, New Zealand and Indonesia. But there had been no contact from the British government. “I find it somewhat surprising, I have spoken to a lot of other governments,“ he said.

    Countering such criticism, Hancock, the health minister, said the government is on track to deliver about 10,000 more ventilators in the coming weeks. One reason Britain was behind some countries on testing, he said, was the absence of a large diagnostics industry at the outbreak of the epidemic. “We didn’t have the scale.”

    GAME OVER

    It was during the school half-term holidays in February that frontline doctor Nicky Longley began to realise that early efforts to contain the disease were likely doomed.

    For weeks now, doctors and public health workers had been watching out for people with flu-like symptoms coming in from China. Longley, an infectious diseases consultant at London’s Hospital for Tropical Diseases, was part of a team that staffed a public health service helpline for those with symptoms. The plan, she said, had been to make all effort to catch every case and their contacts. And “to start with, it looked like it was working.”

    But then, bad news. First, on Wednesday the 19th of February, came the shock news from Iran of two deaths. Then, on Friday the 21st, came a death in Italy and a bloom of cases in Lombardy and Veneto regions. Britain has close links to both countries. Thousands of Britons were holidaying in Italy that week.

    “I don’t think anybody really foresaw what was happening in Italy,“ Longley said. “And I think, the minute everybody saw that, we thought: ‘This is game over now.’”

    Until then, Longley said, everyone felt “there was a chance to stamp it out” even though most were sceptical it could be done long-term. But after Iran and Italy, it was obvious containment would not work. The contact tracing continued for a while. But as the cases in London built up, and the volume of calls to the helpline mushroomed, the priority began to shift to clinical care of the serious cases. “At a certain point you have to make a decision about where you put your efforts as a workforce.”

    Edmunds noted that Iran and Italy had hardly reported a case until that point. “And then, all of sudden you had deaths recorded.” There was a rule of thumb that, in an outbreak’s early stages, for each death there were probably 1,000 cases in a community. “And so it was quite clear that there were at least thousands of cases in Italy, possibly tens of thousands of cases in Italy right then.”

    Amid the dreadful news from Italy, the scientists at NERVTAG convened by phone that Friday, 21st February. But they decided to recommend keeping the threat level at “moderate,“ where it had sat since January 30th. The minutes don’t give a detailed explanation of the decision. Edmunds, who had technical difficulties and couldn’t be heard on the call, emailed afterwards to ask the warning to be elevated to “high,“ the minutes revealed. But the warning level remained lower. It’s unclear why.

    “I just thought, are we still, we still thinking that it’s mild or something? It definitely isn’t, you know,“ said Edmunds.

    A spokesman for the government’s chief scientific adviser, Sir Patrick Vallance, didn’t directly respond to Reuters questions about the threat level. Asked whether, with hindsight, the scientists’ approach was the right one, the spokesperson said in a statement that “SAGE and advisers provide advice, while Ministers and the Government make decisions.”

    HERD IMMUNITY

    On Sunday, March 1st, Ferguson, Edmunds and other advisers spent the day with NHS public health service experts trying to work out how many hospital beds and other key resources would be needed as the outbreak exploded. By now, Italian data was showing that a tenth of all infected patients needed intensive care.

    The following day, pandemic modelling committee SPI-M produced its “consensus report” that warned the coronavirus was now transmitting freely in the UK. That Thursday, March 5, the first death in the UK was announced. Italy, which reached 827 deaths by March 11, ordered a national lockdown. Spain and France prepared to follow suit.

    Johnson held out against stringent measures, saying he was following the advice of the government’s scientists. He asserted on March 9: “We are doing everything we can to combat this outbreak, based on the very latest scientific and medical advice.”

    Indeed, the government’s Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies, SAGE, had recommended that day, with no dissension recorded in its summary, that the UK reject a China-style lockdown. SAGE decided that “implementing a subset of measures would be ideal,“ according to a record of its conclusions. Tougher measures could create a “large second epidemic wave once the measures were lifted,“ SAGE said.

    On March 12 came a bombshell for the British public. Chris Whitty, the chief medical officer, announced Britain had moved the threat to UK citizens from “moderate” to “high.” And he said the country had moved from trying to contain the disease to trying to slow its spread. New cases were not going to be tracked at all. “It is no longer necessary for us to identify every case,“ he said. Only hospital cases would, in future, be tested for the virus. What had been an undisclosed policy was in the open: beyond a certain point, attempts to completely extinguish the virus would stop.

    The same day, putting aside his jokey self, Johnson made a speech in Downing Street, flanked by two Union Jacks and evoking the spirit of Winston Churchill’s “darkest hour” address. He warned: “I must level with you, level with the British public – more families, many more families are going to lose loved ones before their time.”

    For most Britons, it came as a shock. Several of the next day’s newspapers splashed Johnson’s words on their front pages.

    Vallance, the government’s chief scientific adviser, who chaired SAGE, said in a BBC interview on March 13 that the plan was to simply control the pace of infection. The government had, for now, rejected what he called “eye-catching measures” like stopping mass gatherings such as football games or closing schools. The “aim is to try and reduce the peak, broaden the peak, not to suppress it completely.” Most people would get the virus mildly, and this would build up “herd immunity” which, in time, would stop the disease’s progress.

    But by now, the country was rebelling. Major institutions decided to close. After players began to get infected, the professional football leagues suspended their games. As Johnson still refused to close schools and ban mass gatherings, the Daily Mirror’s banner headline, summing up a widespread feeling, asked on March 13: “Is It Enough?”

    The catalyst for a policy reversal came on March 16 with the publication of a report by Neil Ferguson’s Imperial College team. It predicted that, unconstrained, the virus could kill 510,000 people. Even the government’s “mitigation” approach could lead to 250,000 deaths and intensive care units being overwhelmed at least eight times over.

    Imperial’s prediction of over half a million deaths was no different from the report by the government’s own pandemic modelling committee two weeks earlier. Yet it helped trigger a policy turn-around, both in London and in Washington, culminating seven days later in Johnson announcing a full lockdown of Britain. The report also jarred the U.S. administration into tougher measures to slow the virus’ spread.

    Ferguson was now in isolation himself after catching the virus. Testifying by video link to a committee in Parliament, he explained why he and other scientific advisers had shifted from advocating partial social-distancing measures to warning that without a rigorous shutdown, the NHS would be overwhelmed. The reason, he said, lay in data coming out of Italy that showed large numbers of patients required critical care.

    “The revision was that, basically, estimates of the proportion of patients requiring invasive ventilation, mechanical ventilation, which is only done in a critical care unit, roughly doubled,“ he said.

    Edmunds had a different explanation for the policy shift.

    What allowed Britain to alter course, said Edmunds, was a lockdown in Italy that “opened up the policy space” coupled with new data. First came a paper by Edmunds’ own London School team that examined intermittent lockdowns, sent to the modelling committee on March 11 and validated by Edinburgh University. Ferguson’s revised Imperial research followed.

    Woolhouse, the Edinburgh professor, confirmed the sequence.

    Edmunds said these new studies together had demonstrated that if the British government imposed a lengthy period of tougher measures, perhaps relaxed periodically, then the size of the epidemic could be substantially reduced.

    Still, without a vaccine or effective treatments, it’s going to be hard to avoid a substantial part of the British population getting infected, said Edmunds. “Until you get to a vaccine, there is no way of getting out of this without certainly tens of thousands of deaths,“ he said. “And probably more than that.”

    Now subject to intense public scrutiny, the modelling teams at universities across Britain continue to work on different scenarios for how the world can escape the virus’s clutches. According to Medley, the chairman of the SPI-M pandemic modelling committee, no one now doubts, for all the initial reservations, that a lockdown was essential in Britain.

    Medley added: “At the moment we don’t know what’s going to happen in six months. All we know is that unless we stop transmission now, the health service will collapse. Yep, that’s the only thing we know for sure.” – Reuters

    UK PM listened to his scientists about Covid-19, but they were slow to sound the alarm
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  • Inside Story: How Obasa Was Forced To Reinstate Suspended Lawmakers

    Inside Story: How Obasa Was Forced To Reinstate Suspended Lawmakers

    Mudashiru Obasa
    Mudashiru Obasa

    Inside Story: How Obasa Was Forced To Reinstate Suspended Lawmakers 2Mudashiru Obasa

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    At the resumption of plenary on Thursday at the Lagos State House of Assembly, Speaker, Mudashiru Obasa, announced the reinstatement of two suspended lawmakers, Moshood Oshun and Raheem Kazeem.

    The two lawmakers were suspended alongside Deputy Majority Leader, Olumuyiwa Jimoh; and Chief Whip, Rotimi Abiru, who were demoted on grounds of misconduct, insubordination and action that could destabilise the Assembly on March 9.

    However, two days after the meeting of the Governor’s Advisory Council, the suspended lawmakers were reinstated to the House. 

    SaharaReporters had exclusively reported that at the meeting, a former governor of Lagos State, who also doubles as Chairman of Lagos State Governor’s Advisory Committee, Bola Tinubu, supported the Speaker as he asked him to use his discretion to direct the affairs of the House.

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    EXCLUSIVE: Tinubu, GAC Back Lagos Assembly Speaker, Obasa, Over Suspension Of Lawmakers, Corruption

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    However, Obasa tracked back on the decision of the GAC and reinstated the lawmakers following intervention by some bigwigs of the All Progressives Congress including Rauf Aregbesola, Minister of Interior; and Babajide Sanwo-Olu, governor of Lagos.

    Sources privy to the happenings within the party confirmed to SaharaReporters that the Speaker was directed to reinstate the lawmakers after having a separate meeting with them.

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    BREAKING: Lagos Assembly Recalls Suspended Lawmakers After SaharaReporters Story

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    “Some members of the GAC, dissatisfied with the treatment of the oppressed members of the Assembly, including the governor of the state, Babajide Sanwo-Olu, made a counter move between Tuesday and Thursday by securing a special appointment with Tinubu for the affected members of the Assembly to present their cases.

    “An appointment was fixed for Wednesday morning with Tinubu where the affected Assembly members presented their cases to the former governor.

    “Among those who intervened was the immediate-past governor of Osun State and current Minister of Interior, Rauf Aregbesola, who had a long telephone conversation with Asiwaju (Tinubu) and succeeded in convincing his boss on the need for an immediate reversal of Obasa’s autocratic decision against his colleagues.

    “The Speaker was subsequently directed by Tinubu to reverse his decision and return to original status,” sources disclosed to SaharaReporters.

    Meanwhile, Obasa, according to insider sources, is likely sitting on a time-bomb as moves are ongoing by some members of the APC to remove him as Speaker of the Lagos Assembly.

    Some strong members of the political dynasty, beyond the reach or influence of Obasa, seem to be amalgamating forces against him. 

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    EXPOSED: Speaker Of Lagos Assembly, Obasa, Awards Contracts To Self Through Company Registered In Son’s Name

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    4 Days Ago


    Obasa, who is not unaware of the ploy, is suspecting Governor Sanwo-Olu of secretly leading the lawmakers to impeach him.

    “The Speaker once nursed strong animosity against the governor, accusing him of sponsoring members for his impeachment.

    “This also stems the suspicion against the suspended principal officers,” sources in the Assembly said.

    A former member of the Assembly and ‘kingmaker’, who is now a member of the Senate, is also making a separate move to report latest action of the Speaker to Asiwaju.

    As at the time of filing this report, the senator is still in the process of securing an appointment with Tinubu.

    The senator used to be the sponsor and major backer of Obasa but they fell apart when Obasa decided to be his own boss and also reduce the influence of the kingmaker.

    The aim was to reduce the returns shared between them which is part of hundreds of millions allocated to the Assembly as monthly running cost.

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  • Police rescind requirement for interstate travel permit

    Police rescind requirement for interstate travel permit

    Police rescind requirement for interstate travel permit 6

    KUALA LUMPUR: The special police permit requirement for interstate travel on the commencement of the partial lockdown on Wednesday was revoked late on Tuesday – just five hours after the order was issued by police.

    The reversal of the order was announced by Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Abdul Hamid Bador at about 11pm after a high number of police stations nationwide were filled to the brim with those planning to travel during the two-week lockdown period.

    “The public is in the opinion that it can carry out movements if they obtain police approval. As a result of this, there was a large influx of them at police stations and bus stations although only those who meet certain conditions are given approval for any interstate travel. As an early step to overcome this, we are postponing this need to get a permit under the movement control order,” he said last night.

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  • Spinoza’s Ethics of Strength of the Emotions in W Somerset Maughm’s Of Human Bondage

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    The writer probes on the complex world of W. Somerset Maughm’s protagonist in the novel Of Human Bondage, using the propositions the Jewish Portuguese philosopher Baruch Spinoza postulated in his book Ethics in 1674. Some of Spinoza’s propositions are as follows( Morgan, 2006, pp 108-120):

    The following propositions of Spinoza enlighten the changing character of Philip in his own bildungsromans of his life. The force and increase of any passive emotion and its persistence in existing is defined not by the power whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of external causes compared with our own power;

    The force of any passive emotion can surpass the rest of man’s activities or power so that the emotion stays firmly fixed in him;

    An emotion cannot be checked or destroyed except by a contrary emotion which is stronger than the emotion which is to be checked;

    Knowledge of good and evil is nothing other than the emotion of pleasure or pain insofar as we are conscious of it;

    An emotion whose cause we think to be with us in the present is stronger than it would be if we did not think the said cause to be with us;

    We are affected toward a future thing which we imagine to be imminent mo intensely than if we were to imagine its time of existence tofarther away from the present. We are also affected by a remembrance of a thing we imagine to belong to the near past more intensely if we were to imagine it to belong to the distant past;

    An emotion toward a thing which we think of as inevitable [necessarius] is more intense, other things being equal, than emotion toward a thing possible or contingent, that is, not inevitable;

    Emotion toward a thing which we know not exist in the present, and which we imagine to be possible, is, other things being equal, more intense than emotion toward a contingent thing;

    Emotion toward a contingent thing which we know not to exist in the present, is, other things being equal, feebler than emotion toward a thing past;

    No emotion can be checked by the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is;

    Desire that arises from the true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished or checked by many other desires that arise from the emotions by which we are assailed;

    The desires that arises from a knowledge of good and evil insofar as this knowledge has regard to to the future can be the more easily checked or extinguished by desire of things that are attractive in the present;

    Desire that arises from the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as this knowledge is concerned with contingent things can be even more easily checked by desire for things which are present;

    Desire arising from pleasure is, other things being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain;

    Every man, from the laws of his nature, necessarily seeks or avoids what he judges to be good or evil.

    The more every man endeavours and is able to seek advantage, that is, to preserve his own being, the more he is endowed with virtue. On the other hand insofar as he neglects to preserve what is to his advantage, that is, his own being to that extent he is weak.

    Philip is highly affected by nature. There is in Nature no individual thing that is surpassed in strength and power by some other thing. Whatsoever thing there is, there is another more powerful by which the said thing can be destroyed. And he was able to surpass all his problems because of the incoming different emotions, problems which proved to make him stronger if not released from “Human Bondage”.

    The force whereby a man persist in existing is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.

    Philip’s deformity limits his own persistence to live. But his meeting with Hayward, Clutton and Lawson, his former classmates in France, who taught him that life is all about passion and the pursuit of it, he became engross in his art. France did not also care about his clubfoot. Cronshaw taught him more philosophy in life about living in let live. Cronshaw even on his death bed, defied doctors’ prohibition. His life is anyway to end just like any other’s lives.

    Set in Kent, England, a sub-urban near London, the novel presents the multifaceted personal, social, political and religious experiences of Philip carey from his childhood to his middle age of thirty. A bildungsroman (1991, Smiley) in style, which highlights the formation of a youngman’s character through education, travels and early life experiences. Philip at the age of nine, as a young boy, is set apart from his peers by some misfortune and undergoes a humiliating experience that later proves strengthening. his first experience of love is unsuccessful or problematic one that nevertheless paves the way to a happy marriage with a suitable mate. The novel has ample observation, if not criticism, with the character’s institutions such as schools, churches and class structures.

    Philip’s personal life is truly an amalgam of life’s tragedies. But how he surpassed the seemingly insurmountable heap of oppressing weight, if not the meaninglessness or nothingness of life, is the focus of this attempt anchored on Spinoza’s propositions. To enumerate, at an early age, his mother died of tuberculosis and his father, a medical doctor, died of lung cancer. His innocence never understood the situation. He has only the temporary joy of travelling to Blackstable to live with his uncle William and childless Auntie Louisa. Forcibly liking his second family as an orphan, he is left reading his books without noise for his uncle, a Vicar in the community, is irated with children’s unruly behaviour. Aunt Louisa is incapable of understanding Philip. he is left with the care of the governess. His personal disability or deformity, being born with a club-foot, proves to be the stigma of his life forever. His early education in Kingston School, caused his early childhood bitter as his peers laughed at him, mocked and physically abused him because of his physical abnormality. Then, his adolescence which brings him to Heidelberg, Germany to study foreign languages, is never sweet. Girls chided him for his deformity. the consolation is meeting friends like Hayward and Miss Wilkinson, who flirted with him, to his disgust. His sojourn to France, albeit, his uncle’s disappointment, proves to be annihilating. His lack of talent in painting plus his deformity, made him a mediocre student. His classmate Fanny Price, who fell in love with him, on the pretext of sharing the same abnormality (hers is lack of beauty), committed suicide out of hunger and wretchedness.

    Then everything escalated to its height, when realizing that painting is not his passion, he goes back to England. He decides to change again to pursue what his uncle William tells him to do: to follow the footsteps of his father. To be a doctor. feeling he has nothing to do, he embraces the new idea. Sauntering along the Parliamentary Street of London, he is driven to dine in a cafe where he meets the slatternly waitress Mildred Rogers who awakens his sexual desire. But his languid mien, caused by his club-foot proves to be a disadvantage. the waitress prefers rugged and rich men. But his desire to pursue the pale, anaemic, aloof Mildred, beomes a challenge to him. Gradually, the two becomeclose. But the ambitious and materialistic waitress always insults him because of his deformity. to slander him cripple, would totally “cripple” his mood and emotion. Even when Philip is generous to the moody Mildred, she hurt him by marrying a German businessman Miller. His desperation is tantamount to his yearning for Mildred. He is left believing that one day, he would see Mildred again. His concentration with his medical study is forlorned. And Mildred came back,looking sickly, with a child. His generosity and forgiveness for his first love, who hurts him the most, is even greater than life. The ingrate waitress after a little recovery from poverty, elopes with Griffith, Philip’s handsome and robust classmate. That is the height of Mildred’s shamelessness. So her expected return is welcomed with derision by the newly awakened Philip. Even when Mildred turns into a prostitute, Philip is only capable of compassion, without passion or sexual desire. She is freed at last. And Philip is extricated from the pains excruciatingly caused by the destitute Mildred.

    His obsession to Mildred costs Philip his fortune and gradually his savings is left with seven pounds. He is forced to stop from his medical studies that brings him to experience unbelievable poverty. He meets the generous Athelneys who fed and sheltered him in his misery. His uncle’s death, leaving an average fortune, helps him to finish his medical studies. His fateful shelter with the Athelneys brings him to his final, harmonious and peaceful resolution to marry Sally Athelney and go on with his life beautifully. Shakespeare is affirmed by saying that “all is well that ends well.

    At this juncture, it is noteworthy to enumerate Spinoza’s propositions to elucidate Philip’s “bondage” and his strength of his emotion. Spinoza in his preface to his philosophical treatise wrote:

    I assign the term “bondage” to man’s lack of power to control and check the emotions. For a man at the mercy of his emotions is not his own master but is subject to fortune, in whose power he so lies that he is often compelled, although he sees the better course, to pursue the worse. In this Part I have set myself the task of demonstrating why is so, and also what is good and what is bad in emotions. But before I begin, I should like to make a few preliminary observations on perfection and imperfection, and on good and bad ( Morgan, 2006).

    In the beginning, Philip is a slave if not a victim of his emotion. His physical deformity, his club-foot, caused him too much pain. He learned to hate his classmates and,worst, abandoned his belief in God. He could not appreciate the God of his uncle vicar when God cannot give him the miracle he wanted to have normal feet. His painful childhood in school changed him to be rough character. He never wanted to become a vicar anymore. His obsession to Mildred indeed showed his real weakness as a man, and even wretchedness as a human being because of his deformity. he would always think that women cannot love him as he is because of his deformity.

    He who has undertaken something and has brought it to completion will say that the thing is completed; and not only he but everyone who rightly knew, or thought he knew, the intention and aim of the author of that work. For example, if anyone sees a work (which I assumed is not yet finished) and knows that the aim of author is to build a house, he will say the house is imperfect. On the other hand, as soon as he sees that the work has been brought to the conclusion that its author had intended to give it, he will say that the house is perfect. But if anyone sees a work whose like he had never seen before, and he does not know the artifecer’s intention, he cannot possibly know whether the work is perfect or imperfect.

    This appears to have been the original meaning of these terms. But when men began to form general ideas and to devise ideal type of houses, buildings, towers, and so on, and to prefer some models to others, it came about that each called “perfect” that which he saw at variance with his own preconceived ideal, although in the artifecer’s opinion it had been fully completed. There seems to be no other reason why even natural phenomena (those not made by human hand) should commonly be called perfect or imperfect. For men there are wont to form general ideas both natural phenomena and artifacts, and these ideas they regard as models, and they believed that Nature (which they consider does nothing without an end in view) looks to this ideas and holds them before herself as models. So when they see something occurring in Nature at variance with their preconceived ideal of the thing in question, they believed that Nature has then failed or blundered and has left that thing imperfect from their own preconceptions rather than from true knowledge.

    So perfection and imperfection are in reality only models of thinking, notions which we are wont to invent from comparing individuals of the same species or kind; and it is for this reason that I previously said (Def. 6, II) that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For we are wont to classify all the individuals in Nature under one genus which is called the highest genus, namely, the notion of Entity, which pertains to all the individuals in Nature without exception. Therefore insofar as we classify individuals in Nature under this genus and compare them with one another and find that some have more being or reality than others, to that extent we say that some are more perfect than the others. And insofar as we attribute to them something involving negotiation, such as limit, end, impotence and so on, to that extent we call them imperfect because they do not affect our minds as much as those we call perfect, and not because they lack something of anything except that which follows from the necessity of nature of its efficient cause; and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause must be necessarily be so.

    To be a master of his emotion is to attain perfection. It may not be physical but spiritual, mental and emotional. His challenges may have hardened him but enlightened him to loosen up and later, embrace the beauty of life. The unattainable perfection, was answered, through his friend Cronshaw, a poet whom he met in France, that the meaning of life cannot be answered unless one lives it. he realized that men are born, study, work, marry, have children and die is the most beautiful pattern that the Persian rug edifies.

    As for the terms “good” and “bad,” they likewise indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves, and nothing but models of thinking, or notions which we form from comparing things with one another. For one and the same thing can at the same time be good and bad, and also indifferent. For example, music is good for one who is melancholy, bad for one in mourning, and neither good or bad for the deaf. However, although this is so, these terms ought to be retained. For since we desire to form the idea of man which we may look to as model of human nature, we shall find it useful to keep these terms in the sense I have indicated. So in what follows I shall mean by “good” that which we certainly know to be the means for our approaching nearer to the model of human nature that we set before ourselves, and by “bad” that which we certainly know prevents us from reproducing the said model. For it is important to note that when I say somebody passes from a state of less perfection, to a state of greater perfection, and vice versa, I do not mean that he changes from one essence or to form to another (for example, a horse is as completely destroyed if it changes into a man as it would be if it were to change into an insect), but that we conceive his power of activity, insofar as this is understood through his nature, to be increased or diminished.

    Philip may have been both good and bad due to circumstances. he was good in the Blackstable with his Auntie Louisa and Uncle William. he became bad in school because his classmates taunted him because of his clubfoot. In Heidelberg, he is good to all the people even if he did not understand their silence and even their insolence. In France, was forced to become bad, to protect himself from the looming abuses of other foreigners. The death of an anti-social fanny Price, showed him to be the only compassionate painting student.

    Hence, after a series of Philip’s tragedy, his experiences, his meeting with different people, his education, his travel to Heidelberg, to Paris and to London, his affluence and reversal of his fortune to poverty taught him greatest lessons in life. That life can be beautiful if man knows to master his emotion, moderate his desire and be reasonable in every decision. A man is finally freed from the chains and cufflinks ” Of Human Bondage”.

    References:

    Maughm, Somerset W. (1991). Of Human Bondage.

    Canada: Bantam Book Doubleday.

    Morgan, Michael (ed.). (2006). The Essential Spinoza: Ethics And Related Writings.

    Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, Inc.

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    Source by Wilfredo M. Valois

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  • How to Win Consistently at Trading Forex

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    Trading Forex is a fantastic career or hobby, but unless you are winning consistently then it can be a short lived career or an expensive hobby. The elation of a win is often followed by several losses if you don’t have a serious approach to your money management strategy and control of your emotions. In this article we are going to establish a money management and psychological strategy that will help you win consistently at trading Forex.

    First of all let us look at the trade settings themselves. Now this article is not to define a winning strategy; but to show you that even a strategy that only wins 50% of the time can make consistent returns. You may already have a winning strategy but poor money and psychological management.

    It is important to aim for a 3:1 risk reward ratio. In simple terms; you need to look for trades that can offer you 3 times the return of the potential loss. If you adopt this approach then you only need to win 50% of the time because your wins out way the losses by 3 times. Once you master this rule you are well on your way to a winning strategy.

    Research your trades well and do not jump into the markets without doing your analysis whether that is fundamental or technical. If you can stick to these rules then you are half way to winning the psychological battle as well.

    The biggest issue traders face is getting into trades too early because they think they are going to miss the trade or too late because they were scared to pull the trigger. Leaving a trade too early because they believe it is about to turn against them, only to later watch it hit their, would be, take profit level. Or, equally as common, they let the trade run and run expecting more and more profit only to let all the profit get sucked away in a reversal. There is an old saying amongst successful traders “plan your trade and trade your plan. That is exactly what you should do.

    Don not let your emotions let you take profit early if that was not your original plan. Make sure you plan for the trade turning before your profit level and have a preset plan to take profit. A solid plan is to take profit if the trade has reached 90% of the target and is showing signs of reversal. If you have your stop loss set correctly from your original analysis do not extend it as you are compromising your 3:1 risk reward ratio. Keeping these rules in min is the first step to winning consistently at Forex trading.

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    Source by Adam Woods

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  • Compulsive Skin Picking: Habit Reversal Training

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    Often people are seen picking at scabs, blemishes or dry skin. However, there is another form of picking that adopts a more sinister obsessive nature — one that results in not being able to resist the urge or need to pick at certain parts of the skin. This condition is medically known as Dermatillomania or Compulsive Skin Picking (CSP). Only recently has CSP started to become recognized as a serious disorder, as the numbers of reported sufferers continues to steadily increase.

    Skin picking often occurs as an impulsive reaction. There have been numerous cases that suggest many of the sufferers remain unaware that they are in fact picking at blemishes or dry scabs, while others have claimed that it produces a feeling of comfort and satisfaction.

    Treatments for compulsive skin picking generally include medical treatments as well as behavioral treatments. One behavioral method is known as habit reversal training. In its simplest form, habit reversal training involves monitoring and tracking of your skin picking habit and then replacing your behavior with a competing response that you choose to do in place of your undesirable behavior.

    The first step is to keep a diary that captures key information about your skin habit. You’ll want to get a notebook that you can record in, and keep it handy in the area(s) that you generally do your skin picking. In your diary you should record the date, time and behaviors for each time you pick your skin. You’ll want to be sure to record the circumstances in which you desire to pick. Does it happen when you are overstimulated and feeling stressed, anxious or excited? Or do you get the urge to pick when you are bored or inactive? You’ll want to record when the skin picking episodes occur, how long they last, what you were doing at the time, and what was your emotional state. Recording this information for a week or two can give you valuable insight into the triggers that lead up to your skin picking sessions.

    The next step in habit reversal training is to adopt a competing response. This involves choosing a different behavior that you choose to do instead of picking. For example, if you were going to pop a pimple or pick at your face, you could clench your fist or pinch your two index fingers away from your face as if popping an imaginary pimple. Personally, I like to do things at my computer where I have to use two hands typing rather than picking. Sometimes, I just play Solitaire or Sudoku just to keep my mind off of picking.

    Lastly, you should also do things that help reduce stress since this can often trigger picking episodes. Try breathing in deeply though your nose and exhaling out your mouth. Do this numerous times until you feel your body beginning to relax. You can use this as your competing response to avoid picking your skin.

    Try these examples of ways to reverse your habit and also experiment to personalize for yourself.

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    Source by Lisa B Mason

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